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Reputation and the Responsibility
of International Organizations

Abstract
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
Organizations have met a sceptical response from many states, international organizations
(IOs), and academics. This article explains why those Articles can nevertheless have significant practical effect. In the course of doing so, this article fills a crucial gap in the IO literature, and provides a theoretical account of why IOs comply with international law. The IO
Responsibility Articles may spur IOs and their member states to prevent violations and to
address violations promptly if they do occur. The key mechanism for realizing these effects
is transnational discourse among both state and non-state actors in a range of national and
international forums. IOs have reason to be especially sensitive to the effects of this discourse
on their reputations. A reputation for complying with international law is an important facet
of an IO’s legitimacy. The perception that an IO is legitimate is, in turn, crucial to the organ
ization’s ability to secure cooperation and support from its member states. This article argues
that IOs and their member states will take action to prevent and address violations of international law in order to deflect threats to IOs’ reputations – and to preserve their effectiveness.

In Haiti, a Creole slogan is repeated on billboards and spray-painted onto cement walls.
Translated into English, it reads, ‘Cholera is a crime against humanity!’.1 The signs do
not identify the perpetrator, but there would probably be no cholera in Haiti today
but for the presence there of United Nations peacekeepers from Nepal.2 Traditionally,
international organizations3 (IOs) have been viewed as guardians of international law
*
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2
3

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Email: kdaugir@umich.edu.
Krishnaswami, ‘The United Nations’ Shameful History in Haiti’, 19 Aug. 2013, available at www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2013/08/united_nations_caused_cholera_outbreak_in_
haiti_its_response_violates_international.html (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
See infra sect. 3.
This article uses the term ‘international organization’ consistently with the International Law
Commission’s (ILC) definition in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations:
‘[A]n organization established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its own legal personality’: ILC, Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations,
with Commentaries, in Report on the Work of Its Sixty-third Session (26 Apr. to 3 June and 4 July to 12
Aug. 2011), UN Doc. A/66/10, Ch. V [hereinafter IO Responsibility Articles], Art. 2(a).
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Reinisch, ‘Securing the Accountability of International Organizations’, 7 Global Governance (2001) 131,
at 131.
There are many other examples. See ibid., at 132; Mégret and Hoffmann, ‘The UN as a Human Rights
Violator?’, 25 Human Rts Q (2003) 314, at 335–336.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Arts 31, 51–57.
See infra note 35.
Alvarez, ‘Book Review of Dan Sarooshi, International Organizations and Their Exercise of Sovereign
Powers’, 101 AJIL (2007) 674, at 677.
Ibid., at 676–677. See also Alvarez, ‘Misadventures in Subjecthood’, 29 Sept. 2010, available at www.
ejiltalk.org/misadventures-in-statehood/ (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
J. Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (2nd edn, 2009), at 292; see also Alvarez,
‘Misadventures in Subjecthood’, supra note 9 (arguing that the IO Responsibility Articles are unlikely to
become ‘legally important’ in the near future because of the ‘scarcity of judicial venues to address issues
of IO responsibility’).
Cf. A.T. Guzman, How International Law Works (2008), at 55 (‘In trying to understand why a state might
comply with an international obligation, it makes no sense to turn to a rule of international law that
says a failure to comply generates an obligation to make reparation. If there is nothing else to encourage
compliance with the initial obligation, then the rule requiring reparations will be similarly impotent.’).
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rather than as potential violators.4 But occurrences like this one have put IOs under
new scrutiny. Scholars and advocates have contended that IOs might violate international law in various ways. UN peacekeepers might violate international humanitarian law. The IMF might violate the economic, social, and cultural rights of individuals
residing in states that borrow from it. And any number of IOs might violate international labour standards in their dealings with their own employees.5
In 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a set of draft articles
on the responsibility of international organizations (IO Responsibility Articles). These
Articles seek to clarify both the circumstances that establish an IO’s breach of an international obligation and the consequences of such breaches. To that end, these Articles
identify when conduct is attributable to an IO rather than a state or private individual.
They address the circumstances under which violations might be excused. And they
specify the consequences of responsibility. According to the IO Responsibility Articles,
for example, if the peacekeepers’ actions or omissions are attributable to the UN and
those actions or omissions constitute a breach of the UN’s international obligations,
the UN is obliged to make full reparation for injury caused by the violation.6
Many states and IOs reacted sceptically to the ILC’s undertaking. Draft articles produced by the ILC often provide the starting point for multilateral treaty negotiations,
but there are no such plans for the IO Responsibility Articles.7 Many scholars have
also disparaged the ILC’s efforts. José Alvarez, for one, has described the ILC’s effort as
‘at best premature and at worst misguided’.8 In his view, the IO Responsibility Articles
are premature because they are grounded in an extremely limited body of practice
and because so many aspects of the primary norms of international law that bind
IOs are unsettled. Addressing the consequences of violations while the content of primary norms remains controversial puts the cart before the horse, Alvarez argues.9
Separately, Jan Klabbers has questioned the practical effect of the IO Responsibility
Articles’ rules, given the absence of third-party dispute settlement mechanisms that
can bind IOs.10 Klabbers is surely right that the practical effects of the articles cannot
be taken for granted.11
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1 A Tale of Two Efforts to Codify International
Responsibility
To understand why critics doubt the prospects of the IO Responsibility Articles, it is
helpful to contrast them with the ILC’s previously adopted State Responsibility Articles.
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And yet, this article argues, these critics are too pessimistic; the IO Responsibility
Articles are neither premature nor feckless. On the contrary, the IO Responsibility
Articles can help to clarify the primary international law norms that bind IOs. There
are also reasons to think that the IO Responsibility Articles will spur IOs and their
member states to prevent violations and to address violations promptly if they occur.
Realizing these practical effects does not require either negotiating a treaty based on
the IO Responsibility Articles or developing new dispute settlement mechanisms.
The key mechanism for realizing these effects is decentralized discourse about international norms. This article uses ‘transnational discourse’ as shorthand to describe this
discourse, and to emphasize that it takes place among a broad range of actors and in a
broad range of forums. Participants in the discourse include government and IO officials,
NGOs, national legislators, and private individuals. Forums include not just IOs but also
national courts and newspaper editorial pages. The IO Responsibility Articles shape this
discourse by heightening the salience of IOs’ violations of international law, increasing
the likelihood that policy disputes will be framed as violations of international law, and
structuring legal arguments over whether IOs have in fact violated international law.
But will IOs and their member states heed this discourse? Legal process and constructivist scholars have long argued that such discourse plays a prominent role in
explaining states’ behaviour. This article argues that IOs’ are likely to be even more
sensitive to this discourse than states are. IOs’ reputations for compliance with international law are forged through this transnational discourse. A reputation for complying with international law is an important facet of an IO’s legitimacy. The perception
that an IO is legitimate is, in turn, crucial to that IO’s ability to secure cooperation
and support from its member states. This article contends that IOs and their member
states will take action to prevent and address violations of international law in order
to deflect threats to IOs’ legitimacy – and to preserve their effectiveness.
Because the ILC adopted the IO Responsibility Articles only recently, it is early to
look for evidence of these dynamics, and this account is necessarily somewhat speculative. And yet some empirical support already exists. The article examines the stillongoing controversy about claims that the UN violated its international obligations by
inadvertently bringing cholera to Haiti.
International relations and international legal scholarship is rife with theories
about why states will – or will not – comply with their international obligations. To
date, however, efforts to specify IOs’ international obligations and the consequences
for violating them have proceeded without any parallel effort to develop a theoretical
account of why IOs will comply with those obligations. In the course of providing an
account of why the IO Responsibility Articles will have practical effect, this article
identifies and takes a first step to fill a crucial gap in the literature on IOs.
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The ILC took up the topic of IO responsibility just as it was wrapping up a decades-long
effort to adopt a set of articles governing the responsibility of states for violations of
international law. At first glance, the IO Responsibility Articles quite closely track the
State Responsibility Articles on matters of both substance and process.

A Substance

12

13
14
15

16
17
18

ILC, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries
[hereinafter State Responsibility Articles], Yearbook of the ILC (2001), Vol. II, Part 2, at 31, para. 1; IO
Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67, para. 3; but see Nollkaemper and Jacobs, ‘Shared Responsibility
in International Law: A Conceptual Framework’, 34 Michigan J Int’l L (2013) 359, at 408–412 (noting
that some responsibility rules are primary rules under this classification).
State Responsibility Articles, supra note 12, at 31 para. 1; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67–68, para. 5.
ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations: Comments and Observations Received from
International Organizations, UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, 25 June 2004, at 33.
Klabbers, supra note 10, at 292.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 67–68, para. 5.
Ibid., Art. 3.
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According to the ILC, both the State and IO Responsibility Articles address ‘secondary’
rules of international law.12 That is, they address the ‘general conditions under international law for the State [or IO] to be considered responsible for wrongful actions
or omissions, and the legal consequences that flow therefrom’. Neither set of articles
addresses primary rules, or ‘the content of international obligations, the breach of
which gives rise to responsibility’.13 These primary rules are found instead in the international agreements that establish IOs, in treaties to which states or IOs are parties,
and in general international law.
Although they address the same set of issues, the IO Responsibility Articles are
grounded in far less practice than the State Responsibility Articles.14 Indeed, when the
ILC asked selected IOs to document their responses when charged with violating international law, several reported that no such claims had ever been made.15 The scarcity
of practice reflects in part the comparative novelty of IOs (which did not exist in large
numbers before World War II) and of the idea that IOs are both capable of violating
international law and responsible for the consequences of such violations. The scarcity of practice also reflects the paucity of third-party dispute settlement mechanisms
for resolving legal questions about violations of international law by IOs, as well as the
difficulty of accessing those that do exist.16
Because the ILC could draw on only a limited body of practice, its work on IO responsibility was primarily an exercise in the progressive development of international law.
The ILC has acknowledged as much.17 By contrast, the State Responsibility Articles
are built on a much larger body of practice, and most of the articles have a plausible
claim to reflect existing customary international law.
Even the fundamental premise at the heart of the IO Responsibility Articles – that
‘[e]very internationally wrongful act of an international organization entails the international responsibility of that organization’18 – is not beyond doubt. Writing in 1963, the ILC
Special Rapporteur on state responsibility found it ‘questionable whether such organizations
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ILC, Report by Mr. Roberto Ago, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility, Yearbook of the
ILC (1963), Vol. II, at 228–229; see also ibid., at 234 (comments of Jiménez de Aréchaga).
Alvarez, supra note 8, at 676–677.
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 11 Apr. 1949, ICJ
Reports (1949) 174, at 179.
Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory Opinion, 20 Dec.
1980, ICJ Reports (1980) 73, at 89–90.
ILC, State Responsibility, International Responsibility: Report by F. V. Garcia Amador, Special Rapporteur,
Yearbook of the ILC (1956), Vol. II, 173, at 190, para. 83; P. Sands and P. Klein, Bowett’s Law of International
Institutions (6th edn, 2009), at 518; Pellet, ‘The Definition of Responsibility in International Law’, in
J. Crawford et al. (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (2010), at 3, 6–7.
See, e.g., H.G. Schermers and N.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (4th rev. edn, 2003), at 1006,
sec. 1583.
See, e.g., M. Hirsch, The Responsibility of International Organizations towards Third Parties: Some Basic
Principles (1995), at 8; see also Arsanjani, ‘Claims against International Organizations: Quis Custodiet
Ipsos Custodes’, 7 Yale J World Public Order (1980) 131, at 132.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 78 (quoting statement from UN GA, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, UN Doc. A/51/389, 20 Sept. 1996, at 4).
UN Secretary-General, Letter Dated 6 Aug. 1965 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the Acting
Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted in United Nations Juridical
Yearbook (1965), Part One, ch. 2, at 41; Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, supra note 26, at 4, para. 7; Report of the Secretary General, Administrative
and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/51/903,
21 May 1997, paras 10 and 43; Shraga, ‘UN Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage’, 94 AJIL (2000) 406, at 409.
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had the capacity to commit international[ly] wrongful acts’.19 Fifty years later, most academics have come to accept the position that IOs have international legal obligations and
incur international responsibility when they violate them.20 This view builds on the ICJ’s
1949 Reparation for Injuries advisory opinion, in which the ICJ held that the UN has international personality separate from its member states – and that the UN is therefore ‘capable
of possessing international rights and duties’.21 The ICJ has since extended this reasoning
to other IOs.22 Yet the ICJ has never directly addressed the consequences of IOs violating
international obligations.
Many commentators insist that if IOs are capable of having their own international obligations, it is only logical that IOs themselves are responsible for the
violations.23 If the IOs were not responsible, then their member states would be
responsible in their stead, and this outcome contradicts the separate legal personality of the IO.24 The alternative – that nobody would be responsible – is widely considered intolerable.25
The neatness of this logical chain notwithstanding, practice supporting the basic
proposition that IOs are responsible for violations of international law is surprisingly
thin. The ILC commentary quotes the UN Secretary-General explaining the UN’s longstanding practice of settling claims related to injuries caused by UN peacekeepers in
terms of the organization’s international responsibility.26 But the UN has also explained
this practice in terms of its treaty obligations under the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations (the General Convention).27 Section 29 of the General
Convention requires the UN to ‘make provision for appropriate modes of settlement’ of
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34

Conventions on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 1946, 1 UNTS 16.
Report of the Secretary-General, Procedures in Place for Implementation of Article VIII, section 29, of
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/C.5/49/65, 24 Apr.
1995, para. 3.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Art. 3, at 78.
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion, 29 Apr. 1999, ICJ Reports (1999) 62, at 88–89, para. 66.
ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations, First Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, by Mr. Giorgio Gaja, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/532, 26 Mar. 2003, at 6.
IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, Arts 3–5, 9, 11–16, 19–21, 23–24, 26–31, 33–39, 41–47,
54–57, 60, 65–67.
See, e.g., ILC. Responsibility of International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received
from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/636, 14 Feb. 2011, at 5–7 (Austria); ibid., at 8 (Portugal); ILC,
Responsibility of International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/636/Add. 1, 13 Apr. 2011, at 4–5 (Republic of Korea); ILC, Responsibility of
International Organizations, Comments and Observations Received from International Organizations,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/637, 14 Feb. 2011, at 8 (ILO); ibid., at 9 (IMF); ibid., at 10 (joint comments from 13
international organizations); see also Ahlborn, ‘The Use of Analogies in Drafting the Articles on the
Responsibility of International Organizations: An Appraisal of the “Copy-Paste” Approach’, 9 IOLR
(2013) 53 (arguing the ILC should have used closer analogies with the State Responsibility Articles in
order to improve the overall coherence of the law of international responsibility). But see Amerasinghe,
‘Comments on the ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations’, 9 IOLR
(2013) 29, at 29 (arguing that the parallelism between the two sets of articles is ‘acceptable and correct’).
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‘disputes of a private law character’ and disputes involving ‘any official of the United
Nations who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity’.28 These disputes do not
necessarily involve violations of international law; the UN includes arbitration clauses
in its commercial contracts and leases pursuant to section 29, for example.29
The only other support the ILC adduces is a quotation from the ICJ’s 1999 advisory
opinion, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights.30 But this case has nothing to do with the responsibility
of the UN for violations of international law. The case arose after Malaysian companies
sued a UN Special Rapporteur for defamation based on comments he made during an
interview with a magazine reporter. ICJ held that the Special Rapporteur was immune
from suit in national courts. The ICJ’s opinion concluded with the observation that the
‘question of immunity from legal process is distinct from the issue of compensation’, and
even if the UN is immune it may ‘be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising
from such acts’ because of section 29 of the General Convention.31 The ICJ’s statement is
a description of the UN’s primary obligations under the General Convention – not a statement about the consequences of violations of international law. Special Rapporteur’s
allegedly defamatory acts may have caused harm and violated Malaysian law, but there is
no claim that the Special Rapporteur or the UN violated international law.
The ILC had even less practice to draw on when it moved beyond the basic principle of
IO responsibility for violations of international law. To formulate a complete set of articles
on IO Responsibility, the ILC relied heavily on the State Responsibility Articles. ‘It would be
unreasonable for the Commission to take a different approach on issues relating to international organizations that are parallel to those concerning States’, ILC Special Rapporteur
Gaja explained, ‘unless there are specific reasons to do so.’32 In the end, almost two-thirds
of the IO Responsibility Articles directly track their counterparts in the State Responsibility
Articles.33 Many states, IOs, and academics complained that the ILC failed to justify the
substantive similarities between the IO and State Responsibility Articles.34
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In the end, then, many of the individual articles on IO Responsibility have little
claim to reflect extant international law, and as proposals to progressively develop the
law they are controversial.

B Process

35

36

37

38

39

See State Responsibility Articles, supra note 12, para. 72; IO Responsibility Articles, supra note 3, at 51,
para. 85. These recommendations deviated from what had been the ILC’s normal practice for many years.
Murphy, ‘Codification, Progressive Development, or Scholarly Analysis? The Art of Packaging the ILC’s
Work Product’, in M. Ragazzi (ed.), Responsibility of International Organizations: Essays in Memory of Sir
Ian Brownlie (2013) 29, at 32–33.
ILC, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/
CN.4/517, 2–3 Apr. 2001, para. 23 (describing negotiations as potentially destabilizing or ‘decodifying’);
ibid., at 18 (Austria); ILC, State Responsibility, Comments and Observations Received from Governments,
19 Mar., 3 Apr., 1 May and 28 June 2001, UN Doc. A/CN.4/515, at 19 (Netherlands); ibid., at 21 (United
States).
See supra note 34. When the IO Responsibility Articles were discussed in the General Assembly’s
Sixth Committee following the ILC’s recommendation, states’ comments continued to reflect
mixed reactions: see generally Sixth Committee, Summary Record of the 20th Meeting, UN Doc.
A/C.6/66/SR.20, 26 Oct. 2011. For negative comments from a group of 15 IOs see ibid., paras
92–93.
Caron, ‘The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between Form and
Authority’, 96 AJIL (2002) 857, at 866, 868; see also J. Alvarez, International Organizations as LawMakers (2005), at 312.
See UN GA, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Compilation of Decisions of
International Courts, Tribunals, and Other Bodies, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/62/62, 1
Feb. 2007, para. 5; Olleson, ‘The Impact of the ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: Preliminary Draft’ (2007), available at www.biicl.org/files/3107_impactofthearticlesonstate_responsibilitypreliminarydraftfinal.pdf (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
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Turning from substance to process, the State and IO Responsibility Articles again
initially appear similar. When the ILC completed its work on each set of articles, it
recommended that the General Assembly ‘take note’ of its work instead of proceeding towards a multilateral treaty.35 But these identical recommendations obscure very
different levels of political support for the two projects. The states that opposed negotiating a treaty based on the State Responsibility Articles were motivated by a desire
to protect the ILC’s work: they feared that an unsuccessful multilateral negotiation
would undermine claims that the State Responsibility Articles reflect existing customary international law.36 In contrast, the main reason for not pursuing a convention
based on the IO Responsibility Articles appears to be a pronounced lack of enthusiasm
for the ILC’s project among many states and IOs.37
Commentators expected the State Responsibility Articles to be influential even if
they were not codified in a treaty. David Caron argued that international judges and
arbitrators would be especially likely to apply an ‘apparently neutral external source’
like the State Responsibility Articles.38 These intuitions proved correct, as a wealth of
subsequent decisions attests.39 By contrast, international courts and arbitrators will
have few opportunities to apply the IO Responsibility Articles because disputes with
IOs are so rarely resolved by third-party dispute settlement mechanisms.
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The remainder of this article explains why, notwithstanding lukewarm political
support from states and IOs, the IO Responsibility Articles are not a dead letter. On the
contrary, they promise to be influential – but not for the same reasons that the State
Responsibility Articles have been.

2 The IO Responsibility Articles in Transnational Discourse

40

41
42

43

For a helpful distillation of constructivist theories see Brunnée and Toope, ‘International Law and
Constructivism’, 39 Columbia J Transnat’l L (2000) 19, at 25–33.
See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text.
A. Chayes and A. Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty (1995), at 125.; I. Johnstone, The Power of
Deliberation (2011), at 5.
Chayes and Chayes, supra note 42, at 275–276; Johnstone, ‘The Role of the UN Secretary-General’, 9
Global Governance (2003) 441, at 441.
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The view that the IO Responsibility Articles are condemned to irrelevance overlooks
or unduly discounts the ways in which the IO Responsibility Articles can influence
transnational discourse – and the reasons why IOs and their member states are especially sensitive to that discourse. This section describes that discourse and how the
IO Responsibility Articles have already begun to shape it. Section 3 illustrates how
the IO Responsibility Articles have been deployed in transnational discourse regarding
cholera in Haiti – and how that discourse has contributed to clarification about the
UN’s primary obligations and spurred some action by the UN. Section 4 explains why
and how transnational discourse is likely to affect the actions and decisions of IOs and
their member states more generally.
International relations scholars who take a constructivist approach and international lawyers who embrace ‘legal process’ theories have long agreed that discourse
about international norms matters. Rejecting the idea that states’ interests are fixed,
constructivists maintain that discourse shapes states’ interests.40 Legal process theorists emphasize how discourse can cause states to comply with their international
legal obligations.41 Both constructivists and legal process theorists have identified IOs
as important venues42 – and IO officials as important participants43 – in this discourse.
But they have paid less attention to how such discourse might influence what IOs do.
Transnational discourse is decentralized. State officials participate in that discourse. But while states are the key actors deciding whether the IO Responsibility
Articles will become a treaty, state officials do not have a monopoly on transnational
discourse. Other participants in transnational discourse include international civil
servants, multinational enterprises, civil society organizations, and private individuals. They engage in discourse about IOs’ legal norms in a range of forums. These
participants can play three distinct roles in this discourse: they can initiate and perpetuate discussion, they can contribute new legal arguments or relevant facts, and
they can evaluate legal arguments.
Because the motivations and interests of transnational actors diverge, some transnational actors will be willing to press arguments that other transnational actors
would prefer to avoid. For example, national legislatures may be willing to raise
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44

45

46

47
48

49

See, e.g., Daugirdas, ‘Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank’, 107 AJIL (2013) 517;
Deshman, ‘Horizontal Review between International Organizations: Why, How, and Who Cares about
Corporate Regulatory Capture’, 22 EJIL (2011) 1089, at 1108–1112.
Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for
the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’, 95 AJIL (2001) 851, at 868–869; Deshman, supra note 44, at
1097–1098 (describing criticisms of the WHO by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe).
See, e.g., Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’, 106 Yale LJ (1997) 2599, at 2646–2647
(describing legal debates about the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as ‘rag[ing] in many fora: Senate hearings, debates over other arms control treaties, journal articles, and op-ed columns’).
See supra note 38.
Cf. Bederman, ‘Counterintuiting Countermeasures’, 96 AJIL (2002) 817, at 832 (‘writing a rule book for
self-help may actually encourage governments to play a game of punch and counterpunch that they had
previously avoided.’).
Cf. Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the Security Council’, 64
AJIL (1970) 1, at 17 (explaining that although the SC need not assert non-compliance with international
law to trigger its authorities, it often does because ‘the behavior of a state is not easily challenged on
grounds of “policy”; it is clearly preferable, if one wishes to gain the support of those not directly involved,
to show it as a departure from legal obligations’.).
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challenges to IO action about which executive branch officials would be content to
remain silent.44 One IO (or part of an IO) may be in a position to question another IO
(or part of the same IO).45 Finally, non-state actors – and NGOs in particular – may
press legal arguments that governments may be unable or unwilling to make for a
variety of reasons.
The availability of diverse forums for making legal arguments allows trans
national actors to seek out those forums that are most congenial to their positions.
International courts and arbitral tribunals are neither the only important venues nor
indispensable ones. Transnational discourse can occur in national legislatures, as well
as in the pages of academic journal articles and newspapers.46 Some forums can be
useful even though they are formally unavailable to hear particular claims. IOs typically enjoy immunity from suit in national courts, for example, but these courts can
nevertheless be important venues for transnational discourse. Even if cases filed in
national courts are ultimately dismissed, those cases can call attention to challenged
actions or omissions by IOs.
The IO Responsibility Articles are likely to influence transnational discourse about
IOs in the following ways. Transnational actors are likely to cite them for the same reasons that international courts and tribunals so readily turn to the State Responsibility
Articles.47 Both sets of articles offer a detailed, readily accessible, and ostensibly neutral set of rules that specify when IOs are responsible for violations of international
law. Indeed, transnational actors seeking to bolster their legal claims would be foolish
not to invoke them.
The IO Responsibility Articles may also increase the quantity of transnational discourse about IOs that is framed in legal terms.48 By heightening the salience of IO violations of international law, the IO Responsibility Articles may indirectly encourage
transnational actors to frame their policy disputes with various IOs in these terms.49
The result is not only more discourse about the topic the IO Responsibility Articles
address directly – the consequences of violations of international law. The result is
also more discourse about the content of the primary norms that bind IOs.

1000

EJIL 25 (2014), 991–1018

3 Transnational Discourse in Action: Cholera in Haiti
Since the adoption of the IO Responsibility Articles, the most extensive transnational
discourse regarding IO obligations and the consequences of violations has involved
allegations that the UN inadvertently introduced cholera into Haiti. This section demonstrates how non-state actors initiated and perpetuated that discourse. They also
introduced new legal arguments and relevant factual information, and evaluated legal
arguments made by other actors – especially the UN. This section also rebuts the claim
that the IO Responsibility Articles are not premature because disagreement persists
about the IOs’ primary international law obligations. Clarity about IOs’ primary obligations need not precede the development of the IO Responsibility Articles because the
50
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UN Doc. A/CN.4/545, supra note 15, at 33.
Clarke, ‘Responsibility of International Organizations under International Law for the Acts of Global
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World Bank and Other International Financial Institutions Must Uphold Human Rights in All Activities
They Support’, 16 Sept. 2013, available online at amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/IOR41/020/2013/en/
e379235b-84ea-4062-898d-a17506b28340/ior410202013en.pdf (last visited 24 Nov. 2014).
Ibid., at 3.
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Consider some examples. The World Trade Organization (WTO) reported to the ILC
in 2002 that ‘no claim was ever made against the WTO alleging a violation of international law’.50 Since then, academic commentators have begun to explore how the
WTO might violate international law.51 The World Health Organization (WHO) likewise reported that ‘to our knowledge no such claims have ever been made against the
WHO’.52 A recently published article contends that that ought to change, arguing that
the WHO ought to be responsible under international law for the acts of public–private partnerships in which it participates.53
NGOs are increasingly invoking the IO Responsibility Articles to reinforce their
arguments about IOs’ obligations and the consequences of violations. Recently
Amnesty International, along with several other NGOs, submitted a written statement to the Human Rights Council urging it focus on the human rights obligations
of the international financial institutions (IFIs) including the World Bank.54 After all,
as the written statement explains, the ILC’s Articles on IO Responsibility ‘confirm[s]
that intergovernmental organizations, such as IFIs, are subjects of international law,
and as such they have international law obligations that they must comply with’.55
Several months earlier, Human Rights Watch had issued its own report addressing the
World Bank’s legal obligations to respect and protect human rights – and invoking the
Articles on IO Responsibility to support its arguments.56
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IO Responsibility Articles themselves can help to achieve that clarity. In fact, the transnational discourse about the UN’s role and obligations in connection with cholera in
Haiti has shed light on some of the UN’s primary legal obligations. Finally, this section
describes how the UN’s position has shifted since that discourse began. Although it is
impossible to establish definitively why those shifts occurred, the next section argues
that IOs have reasons to be especially sensitive to such transnational discourse.
UN peacekeepers were already in Haiti when a devastating earthquake struck on 12
January 2010. The Security Council had established the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH57) six years earlier in the wake of a contested presidential election
that resulted in armed conflict in several cities across Haiti.58 After the earthquake
struck, the Security Council increased MINUSTAH’s force levels and expanded its
mandate to include supporting recovery, reconstruction, and stability efforts.59
Ten months after the earthquake, on 22 October 2010, the Haiti National Public
Health Laboratory confirmed the first cholera case in Haiti in nearly a century.60 Since
then, more than 700,000 individuals have been infected, and more than 8,500 have
died from cholera.61
Within 10 days of the first confirmed case, the US Centers for Disease Control identified the bacteria strain that caused the outbreak as ‘similar to a cholera strain found in
South Asia’.62 Suspicions that the UN peacekeepers and the cholera were linked arose
quickly. The UN spokesperson for MINUSTAH nevertheless denied any ‘objective link
. . . between the soldiers and the outbreak’.63
On 6 January 2011, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed an independent
panel to investigate the source of the cholera outbreak.64 That panel did not explicitly identify MINUSTAH as the source of the cholera. But the panel found that the
sanitation conditions at the Mirebalais MINUSTAH camp were insufficient to prevent
contamination of the Meye Tributary System of the Artibonite River. And the panel
concluded that ‘the evidence overwhelmingly supports the conclusion that the source
of the Haiti cholera outbreak was due to contamination of the Meye Tributary of the
Artibonite River with a pathogenic strain of current South Asian type Vibrio cholorae
as a result of human activity’.65
According to press reports, a UN spokesperson said the panel’s report ‘does not
present any conclusive scientific evidence linking the outbreak to the MINUSTAH
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peacekeepers or the Mirebalais camp’.66 The Secretary-General issued a statement
indicating that he intends to ‘convene a task force within the United Nations system,
to study the findings and recommendations made by the Independent Panel of Experts
to ensure prompt and appropriate follow-up’.67
NGOs first pressed the argument that the UN had violated its international legal
obligations. In November 2011, the Boston-based Institute for Justice and Democracy
(IJDH), working together with a human rights group in Haiti, initiated transnational
discourse – and made arguments that Haiti and other UN member states were either
unable or unwilling to make – when they presented Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
with a formal petition.68
The petitioners argued that the UN acted ‘negligently, recklessly, and with deliberate indifference for the Petitioners’ health and lives’69 – and that the UN’s actions and
omissions relating to the introduction of cholera violated several different international obligations. The petitioners alleged that the UN violated the Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) between the UN and Haiti, which required the UN to respect
Haitian law.70 They also argued that the UN failed to comply with international environmental principles and violated the petitioners’ fundamental human rights.71
Separately, the petitioners argued that the UN had obligations to provide compensation under treaty law, customary international law, and the IO Responsibility Articles.
The petitioners cited section 29 of the General Convention (which requires the UN to
‘make provisions for the settlement’ of specified categories of disputes72) and a provision of the SOFA that calls for the establishment of a standing claims commission to
settle ‘third-party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness, or
death arising from or directly attributed to MINUSTAH’.73 The petitioners also argued
that the UN has obligations under the UN Charter and customary international law to
provide an effective remedy. Finally, and most importantly for my purposes, the petitioners argued that the law of IO responsibility requires the UN to ‘make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’.74
By filing this petition with the UN, IJDH also prompted legal discourse within
the UN, which needed to respond in some way. The UN took its time in doing so;
the claimants heard nothing for 15 months. But on 21 February 2013, the UN
Secretary-General informed Haitian President Michel Martelly that the UN had
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rejected the petition.75 Patricia O’Brien, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Legal
Affairs, supplied a written response. Most of her letter addressed efforts by the UN
to combat cholera in Haiti and to improve sanitation. The letter included only two
sentences about the legal arguments in the petition, and those addressed only the
General Convention:

In this initial response, the UN thus ignored most of the legal arguments that
IJDH made.
Once the UN had publicly provided a reason (however thin) for denying the petition,
transnational actors were in a position to evaluate the UN’s position. Unsurprisingly,
IJDH found the UN’s rationale unsatisfying, and followed up with another letter
challenging O’Brien’s interpretation of the General Convention and its consistency
with the UN’s own practice.77 O’Brien’s response to this second missive was brief. It
repeated the UN position that the petitioners’ claims were ‘not receivable’.78 It also
included a sentence addressing the argument that the SOFA required the establishment of a standing claims commission. The UN asserted that ‘[t]here is no legal basis
for the United Nations to establish such a commission in respect of claims that are not
receivable’.79
The events that followed highlight how transnational actors can perpetuate transnational discourse. Although O’Brien’s letters signalled the UN’s desire to consider
the matter closed, transnational discourse continued in other forums. Rejection of
the petition received extensive and uniformly critical press coverage.80 Nineteen members of the US Congress sent a letter to Secretary-General Ban urging him to ‘use
[his] office and [his] influence to ensure that the UN takes responsibility for the introduction of cholera into Haiti’.81 Advocates in Haiti contemplated suing the Haitian
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With respect to the claims submitted, consideration of these claims would necessarily include a
review of political and policy matters. Accordingly, these claims are not receivable pursuant to
Section 29 [of the General Convention].76
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government seeking to compel it to seek compensation from the UN.82 A team of
Brazilian lawyers has reportedly filed a case against the UN in the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights on behalf of Haitian cholera victims.83 Even the members of
the panel appointed by the Secretary-General re-entered the discourse. On their own
initiative, they released a follow-up report in July 2013. Citing research completed
after their original report was released, the panel members stated: ‘[T]he preponderance of the evidence and the weight of the circumstantial evidence does lead to the
conclusion that personnel associated with the Mirebalais MINUSTAH facility were the
most likely source of introduction of cholera into Haiti.’84
Another group associated with Yale University (referred to here as the Yale Group)
issued a report in August 2013 that pressed a set of arguments similar to those in
the IJDH’s petition. The Yale Group’s report argued that the UN had violated (1) its
obligations under the SOFA and (2) its human rights obligations by failing to respect
the right to water, the right to health, the right against the arbitrary deprivation of
life, and the right to an effective remedy.85 The report also rejected the interpretation
of the General Convention contained in O’Brien’s letter. The report cited both the IO
Responsibility Articles and comments the UN made to the ILC to support its claims
that ‘when a peacekeeping force breaches an international obligation of the U.N., the
organization is responsible both for the breach and for remedying it’.86
In September 2013, Haitian Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe addressed cholera when
he spoke before the General Assembly. His restrained comments reflect the difficulty of
making demands on the UN while relying heavily on its assistance. ‘While we continue
to believe that the United Nations has a moral responsibility in this epidemic, it nevertheless remains true that the UN remains supportive of the efforts of the Government and
various national and international agencies involved to eradicate this scourge’, he said.87
On 9 October 2013, IJDH initiated transnational discourse in a new forum: it filed
an action in the Southern District of New York against the UN.88 The complaint does
not cite the IO Responsibility Articles, but does observe that it is ‘well-established under
international law and UN documents, resolutions, reports and treaties that Defendants
UN and MINUSTAH can incur legal liability and have an obligation to provide compensation for injury caused by them’.89 The UN’s immunity from suit is well-established in
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US law, and the US government has filed a brief supporting the UN’s immunity in the
action brought by IJDH.90 As the lawyers who filed the case know, the likelihood that
their action will be dismissed hardly makes it pointless. On the contrary, such actions
call attention to the facts of the case and spur further transnational discourse. Indeed,
news of the action quickly spread across the globe. The New York Times published an
editorial emphasizing that ‘even a body immune to legal claims cannot shed accountability’.91 Newspapers in South Africa picked up the message too, publishing editorials
calling on the UN to ‘acknowledge responsibility, apologize to Haitians, and give the victims the means to file claims against it for the harm they say has been done to them’.92
The publicity surrounding the court action prompted a key UN official to reveal that
IJDH’s petition had already prompted considerable discussion and reflection within
the UN itself. Speaking at an awards ceremony in Geneva, UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights Navi Pillay spoke out in favour of compensation. She said, ‘I have
used my voice both inside the United Nations and outside to call for the right – for an
investigation by the United Nations, by the country concerned, and I still stand by the
call that victims of – of those who suffered as a result of that cholera be provided with
compensation’.93 Responding to Pillay’s comments, Nicole Phillips, a lawyer for IJDH,
underscored that the federal district court was not the only – or even the most import
ant – forum for resolving the dispute. As she put it, ‘public support for the cholera
victims’ claims could be a game changer in their claims against the U.N.’.94
In the months that followed, transnational discourse continued in other forums. In
January 2014, 65 members of the US Congress wrote a letter to the US Ambassador
to the UN emphasizing that the ‘United Nations has a moral and legal obligation to
redress the harm resulting from the actions of its peacekeeping operations’.95 Because
of the US Congress’s role in appropriating funds for the UN, members of Congress
can be particularly influential participants in transnational discourse. In March, two
additional actions by Haitian victims were filed in US courts.96 The next month, an
independent expert on the situation of human rights in Haiti, appointed by the UN
Human Rights Council, called for the establishment of a reparation commission for
cholera victims ‘to enable damages to be recorded, corresponding benefits or compensation paid, the persons responsible to be identified, the epidemic to be stopped and
other measures to be implemented’.97
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The UN’s terse declaration that the petitioners’ original claim was ‘not receivable’
under the General Convention has become a focal point for further transnational
discourse among a still broader set of actors with expertise to evaluate it. None has
endorsed the UN’s position. Bruce Rashkow, a 10-year veteran of the UN Office of
Legal Affairs weighed in, stating that he ‘did not recall any previous instance where
such a formulation was utilized in regard to such claims’.98 Separately, a group of
international law scholars and practitioners filed an amicus brief in the IJDH litigation arguing that the Haitian plaintiffs’ claims fell squarely within section 29 of the
General Convention, and were exactly the kinds of private law claims to which the UN
had an obligation to respond.99 In the absence of any UN-established procedure for
doing so, they argued, the court should reject the UN’s claim to immunity from suit.100
This transnational discourse has not yielded a single clear answer to these questions about the UN’s treaty obligations, much less an authoritative one. But by participating in this discourse, transnational actors are contributing to a growing body of
information that makes it possible for other transnational actors to both reconstruct
a more complete version of the UN’s position and to evaluate its merits. These are
incremental steps – but also necessary steps – towards clarifying the UN’s primary
obligations under the General Convention and the UN-Haiti SOFA. And to the extent
that the IO Responsibility Articles are prompting this transnational discourse about
the UN’s legal obligations, the IO Responsibility Articles are helping to achieve greater
clarity about these legal obligations.
Since this transnational discourse began, the UN has taken steps to address cholera
in Haiti directly. In December 2012 – some 13 months after IJDH filed its petition and
two months before the UN announced its decision to deny the petition – SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-Moon announced a 10-year, US$2.2 billion initiative that would
invest in prevention, treatment, and education regarding cholera in both Haiti and
the neighbouring Dominican Republic.101 The UN estimated that about one quarter of
this amount – $448 million – would be needed for the first two years (2013–2015).102
In December 2013, the UN reported that about half of this amount has been committed or pledged so far.103
In July 2014, as Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon prepared to visit Haiti, he made
a statement that reflected a significant shift in the UN’s rhetoric. ‘Regardless of what
the legal implication may be, as the secretary general of the United Nations and as a
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person, I feel very sad’, Ban said. He continued, ‘I believe that the international community, including the United Nations, has a moral responsibility to help the Haitian
people stem the further spread of this cholera epidemic.’104 No substantive policy
changes accompanied this statement.
*

*

*

4 Why Transnational Discourse Matters: IO Legitimacy
and Reputation
This section returns to a more general question about the role of transnational
discourse in influencing IOs. Suppose that the IO Responsibility Articles will both
spur and structure transnational discourse about what IOs’ international obligations are, whether IOs are complying with them, and the consequences of violations. Is there reason to think that that discourse will affect the actions or decisions
of IOs or their member states? This section argues that the answer is yes. In short,
here’s why. The perception that an IO is legitimate (i.e., its sociological legitimacy)
depends in part on the perception that the organization is complying with its international obligations.105 That perception is forged through the transnational discourse described in section 2. Legitimacy and effectiveness of IOs are tightly linked
because IOs depend on voluntary state cooperation and state financial support to
carry out their decisions and operations. Unless they are perceived as legitimate, IOs
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The transnational discourse about the UN’s actions and omissions with respect to cholera in Haiti is hardly over. There has been no objective or authoritative determination
that the UN’s conduct in connection with Haiti has violated international law – and
there may never be. But the transnational discourse has effectively challenged the UN’s
legal position. And as pressure from that transnational discourse mounted, the UN took
some action to address cholera in Haiti and the Secretary-General shifted his rhetorical position. It is important to remember that we remain in medias res and the UN may
still do more – especially if US courts decline to recognize the organization’s immunity.
The more transnational actors conclude that the UN’s legal position is untenable, the
greater the pressure grows on the UN to do more for cholera victims in Haiti.
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will have a difficult time securing either one.106 IOs that are less effective because
they are perceived to be illegitimate will be less useful to their member states and
may even risk being shut down.107 Because IOs that are perceived to be illegitimate
will be less effective, IOs and their member states will take pains to ensure that IOs
avoid – or respond to – credible charges that they are violating international law.
In addition to explaining why the IO Responsibility Articles can have practical
effect, this account constitutes a first step towards constructing a theoretical account
of why IOs comply with their international legal obligations. International relations
theorists and international lawyers have offered many accounts of why states comply
with international law – but to date they have not asked the same question of IOs.
Legal process theorists – who share the view that transnational discourse matters –
offer various accounts about how that discourse induces states to comply with their
international obligations. Two of these rely on both reputation and transnational
discourse.
Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes argue that states have a propensity
to comply with their international obligations because they have a functional need
to be accepted members in good standing of the international community.108 It is
only by participating in various international regimes as members in good standing
that states can achieve their principal purposes: security, economic well-being, and
a decent level of amenity for their citizens.109 Transnational discourse, on Chayes’
and Chayes’ account, reinforces states’ propensity to comply with their international
treaty obligations.110
Ian Johnstone blends constructivist and rational-choice approaches (the latter posit
that states pursue their exogenously defined interests through international interactions).111 Johnstone argues that states derive instrumental benefits from maintaining
a reputation for compliance with international law. IO membership, in turn, heightens
the value to states of maintaining a good reputation: states that benefit from participating in international institutions will want to preserve a reputation obtained from
playing by the rules so that they can continue to benefit from those institutions.112
Transnational discourse also affects states’ interests as they internalize the norms of
the regimes in which they participate.113
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A IOs’ Reputation for Compliance
The universe of IOs is diverse. IOs vary in the breadth or specificity of their missions,
in their criteria for membership, in the extent of their authorities, and in the allocation
of those authorities between organs made up of member states and organs made up
of international civil servants. Some political scientists have modelled relationships
between member states and IOs in principal–agent terms.117 Others emphasize the
degree of IO autonomy and implicitly or explicitly challenge the appropriateness of
the principal–agent model.118 For purposes of this argument, resolving this debate is
unnecessary. Under both views, member states and international civil servants have
discretion. This article argues that both have reason to heed transnational discourse
and exercise that discretion in a way that protects IOs’ reputations for compliance
with international law.
Defending an IO’s reputation is, moreover, an ongoing project. An IO’s reputation
– and by extension its legitimacy – is not established once and for all. On the contrary,
it is always vulnerable to charges of non-compliance with international law by transnational actors.119
Time and again, IO officials have emphasized the fundamental importance of compliance with international law for the effectiveness of their operations. Consider two
examples. François Gianviti, former General Counsel for the IMF, wrote:
114
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118
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Some rational-choice scholars have responded sceptically to accounts that credit
discourse with causing states to comply with their international obligations. They
acknowledge that states often use legal rhetoric and defend their actions in legal terms,
but, they argue, talk is cheap and a poor indicator of what states will actually do.114
Rational-choice scholars generally agree that maintaining a reputation as a reliable
international partner will sometimes induce states to comply with their international
obligations. A bad reputation imposes costs, which may include exclusion from future
opportunities to cooperate or tougher terms of cooperation.115 Rational-choice scholars disagree, however, about how often – if ever – concerns about avoiding a bad reputation will trump states’ short-term interests in non-compliance.116 This article argues
that the reasons these scholars have adduced for doubting the significance of reputation and legal discourse in inducing states to comply with international law have far
less force as applied to IOs.
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International organizations are also subject to the rule of law. Their members, their debtors
and their creditors all expect them to carry out their activities at all times in conformity with
the rules that apply to them. However, the international financial organizations, including the
Fund, are helping their member countries in developing sound frameworks for governance and
better legal and judicial systems, all of which highlights the rule of law as a central element of
development. If international organizations are to be successful at this task, they must be credible. To be credible, they must apply the rule of law to their own situation, just as they encourage others to apply it to theirs.120

The United Nations has an especially high onus to discharge so as to be taken seriously and
fulfill its unique normative role in the human rights field. Its effectiveness in encouraging compliance with human rights norms lies in the balance, as does its very legitimacy.121

Scholars who question the significance of reputation point out that the value of a reputation for complying with international law is not the same for every state.122 Indeed,
some states may find it preferable to cultivate other kinds of reputations. Strong states
may believe that they will be better able to achieve their foreign policy objectives by
establishing reputations for toughness, while others may prefer to cultivate reputations for irrationality or unpredictability.123 Reputations that may be appealing to isolationist states like North Korea, however, are simply unavailable to IOs. Even more
than states, IOs need to be members in good standing of the international community because they depend on their member states for their continued existence.124 The
stakes of maintaining a reputation for complying with international law are thus typically higher for IOs than for states. For an IO, the cost of a bad reputation may include
termination.
A reputation for complying with legal obligations may also be more important to
IOs than to states because the risk that the organization’s immunities will be stripped
away remains salient. IOs generally enjoy comprehensive immunity from suit in
national courts. But IOs are usually cautious about their privileges and immunities,
and often take steps to avoid the charge that they are abusing them. The UN General
Assembly, for example, cited its intention ‘to prevent the occurrence of any abuse’ in
connection with its immunities when, in 1946, it instructed the Secretary General
to make sure that the drivers of all UN cars were properly insured.125 Similarly, the
World Bank established an administrative tribunal to resolve disputes with its staff
120
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Louise Arbour, a former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Mac Darrow, a
former official in that office, have emphasized the same point with respect to the UN’s
obligations to avoid causing or contributing to human rights violations:
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members in part to ensure that national courts continued to respect its immunity.126
The Legal Counsel for the World Intellectual Property Organization observed that IOs
insert arbitration clauses in all commercial contracts and purchase agreements with
private parties in order to both ‘meet[] their obligations and avoid[] the criticism that
international organizations hide behind their privileges and immunities’.127
Before a violation can affect a state’s (or IO’s) reputation, the violation must be
detected.128 Detection cannot be taken for granted; states monitor each other imperfectly, and states can (and do) take steps to conceal violations.129 Unlike states, IOs lack
territory of their own: they act in the territory of other states. Compared with many
states, IO decision-making procedures are relatively transparent. They will usually
involve a range of actors from outside the IO, including, at the very least, representatives of member states. For these reasons, IOs may be less likely than states to be able
to shield their reputations by concealing violations.
Should they occur, violations of international law will usually exact a high toll on
IOs’ reputations. IOs’ reputations may suffer more than states’ reputations from violations for another reason. The states that take the biggest reputational hits from violating international law are those with the best reputations for compliance. After all, if
no one expects a state to comply with its obligations in the first place, a new violation
will confirm rather than damage its reputation.130 Expectations that IOs will comply
with their international obligations, however, are generally high.
Member states also have incentives to invest in the legitimacy and reputation of
existing IOs. After all, IOs are not easily replaced. Establishing new IOs – especially new
IOs with universal membership – is not impossible, but it is very costly. The difficulty
of establishing new IOs makes it harder for states to treat existing IOs as disposable.
Critics of legal process theory have downplayed the significance of discourse, arguing that it will secure compliance only where cooperation is shallow and states do not
have much to gain from violations.131 Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner go further; they
discount almost entirely the significance of international discourse.132 Most international discourse, they argue, is ‘a kind of empty happy talk’ that is ‘largely a ceremonial
usage designed to enable the speaker to assert policies and goals without overtly admitting that he or she is acting for a purpose to which others might object’.133
Whatever force these objections may have with respect to states, they do not carry
over to IOs. IOs cannot afford to engage in ‘empty happy talk’ about their compliance
with their international obligations. For IOs, such talk is inevitably expensive. A false
claim that an IO is complying with a particular obligation imperils the IO’s reputation
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B Deflecting Threats to Legitimacy and Reputation
The desire to preserve an IO’s legitimacy and reputation for compliance with international law has spurred three different responses when that reputation is challenged. In
some cases IO organs comprised entirely of member states took these actions; in other
cases, international civil servants did. Regardless of whether states or international
civil servants were the key actors for a particular decision, the steps they took to deflect
threats to legitimacy and reputation fall into three categories; the UN’s response to
cholera in Haiti suggests a fourth.
134
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and its perceived legitimacy. As explained above, violations of international law by
IOs may be particularly likely to be discovered. If evidence is unearthed that an IO is
violating an international legal obligation, a wide range of transnational actors have
available to them a wide range of forums in which to press the charge that the IO is in
breach. If these charges are credible, they pose a risk to the legitimacy and reputation
of an IO that both the IO and its member states have reason to protect.
A different objection that might be raised to this account of both IO reputation and
legitimacy is that it defines too narrowly what makes IOs useful to their member states.
Perhaps IOs are useful to their member states because they provide an opportunity to
shift blame or shirk responsibility for unpopular or unsuccessful policies.134 Maybe, for
example, the IMF serves as a convenient bogeyman or scapegoat for its member states.
Because the IMF imposes and enforces conditions on its loans, the IMF becomes the
target of borrowing states’ ire while individual states escape it.135 On this account, UN
peacekeeping could be similarly useful. Individual member states benefit from appearing
responsive to conflicts abroad by establishing a peacekeeping force, and then to blame
the UN when the conflict persists – even when part of the problem is that the Security
Council provided the peacekeepers with insufficient authorities or personnel.136
Even if member states do use IOs to shift blame in this way, they should still care
about protecting the organizations’ legitimacy and reputation for complying with
their international obligations.137 A delegitimized IMF will not be very effective at
enforcing policy conditions on its loans. And Security Council members will hardly be
able to make the case that they have dispatched their responsibility to ‘do something’
about an international conflict by establishing a peacekeeping force if peacekeeping
forces are patently ineffective or regularly violate international humanitarian law.
One can credibly shift blame for failure to an IO only if there is reason to believe that
the IO could plausibly have succeeded.138
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First, and most obviously, IOs sometimes take steps to comply with the relevant
international norm. Numerous examples of IOs taking such steps – even without
resolving debates about whether those norms bind the IO – testify to the importance
to IOs of avoiding reputations for being outlaws.139 In 1999, UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan mooted decades of debate about whether international humanitarian
law binds the UN – and specifically UN peacekeepers. Annan adopted a regulation
requiring peacekeepers to comply with both the fundamental principles and rules of
international humanitarian law and to protect civilian populations and the natural
environment in ways that exceeded the requirements of customary international
law.140 More recently, UN Security Council sanctions targeting individuals and entities
associated with Al-Qaida have been criticized in transnational discourse for violating human rights norms.141 European courts struck down regulations implementing
the sanctions regime for failing to comply with fundamental rights protected by the
European legal order.142 Facing threats to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the sanctions regime, the Security Council adopted a series of incremental reforms.143
Second, the IO may cease the activity that is the source of the challenge to the
IO’s reputation. One example involves comprehensive economic embargoes by the
Security Council. Starting in the 1990s, these embargoes encountered growing opposition because of the suffering they imposed on the civilian population in targeted
states. Some scholars argued that imposing comprehensive economic embargoes violated the Security Council’s obligations to protect and promote human rights.144 The
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized that IOs imposing
sanctions have obligations to respect those rights.145 The Security Council responded
(albeit not directly) by turning away from comprehensive economic embargoes and
increasingly resorting to more limited types of economic sanctions.146
Another example concerns sanctions that the Security Council imposed on Libya
in the wake of the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Aiming to
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delegitimize the sanctions, Libya argued that the Security Council had violated international law by imposing sanctions before the two Libyan suspects had even been
tried.147 Libya also maintained that the Security Council had unlawfully circumvented the dispute resolution procedures set out in the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and initiated proceedings before the ICJ to vindicate this claim. Libya’s legal arguments found a sympathetic audience among some states – and emboldened them to defy the Security
Council.148 In 1998, the Organization of African Unity adopted a formal resolution
deciding not to comply with the sanctions regime on the grounds of its illegality.149 As
rates of non-implementation increased still further, the crumbling sanctions regime
threatened to expose the Council as out of step with the international community.
The Security Council could impose binding legal obligations on states to sanction
Libya, but it could not force them to follow through. The Security Council deflected
the challenge to its legitimacy by accepting a compromise that the United States and
the United Kingdom had previously dismissed as a ‘non-starter’ – and suspending the
sanctions regime.150
The stronger the argument that an IO is violating a particular norm, the greater the
reputational threat that continued violation poses, and the more likely it is that the IO
and its member states will take steps to deflect that threat. And yet, in all of these surveyed examples, when IOs have taken steps to eliminate conflicts with particular norms
(either by coming into compliance with them or by ceasing the challenged activity),
they have taken them without explicitly acknowledging that international law obliged
them to do so. Secretary-General Annan adopted the regulation requiring peacekeepers
to comply with humanitarian law without acknowledging that UN forces are directly
bound by the Geneva Conventions or customary international law.151 The Security
Council has acknowledged in general terms that the Al-Qaida sanctions regimes faced
‘challenges, both legal and otherwise’, but never conceded that the changes it made
were legally required.152 A course correction by the IO, then, is not necessarily coupled
with an authoritative resolution of the underlying legal issues.
This is not to suggest that IOs will always be silent in transnational discourse.153 Indeed,
a third way to deflect the reputational harm from violating an international obligation is
to contest that the obligation in question actually binds the IO. As noted earlier, there is
considerable uncertainty about some of the primary norms that bind IOs.154 And failure
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to comply with a norm that does not bind the IO should not affect the IO’s reputation for
compliance with international law – and by extension this facet of the IO’s legitimacy.155
The IMF took this third option in response to arguments by scholars and advocates that
the IMF had violated its obligations to comply with international norms contained in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The IMF General
Counsel published an extensive legal analysis rebutting those arguments.156 This legal
analysis triggered further rejoinders, of course.157 But the IMF’s vigorous legal response
appears to have eased the pressure to respond to the threat to its reputation through the
kinds of actions described above.158
Initially the UN’s response to Haiti on cholera fitted the third category described
above – denial of any relevant primary obligations. Unlike the IMF in the example set
out above, however, the UN did not publicly engage in a detailed legal argument. The
UN’s conclusory sentences rejecting the Haitian petitioners’ claim failed to quell the
controversy. Indeed, the UN’s initial response has been described as a ‘public relations
as well as public health disaster’159 – and might initially appear to contradict rather
than confirm this article’s account that IOs are motivated to protect their reputations.
The subsequent actions that the UN has taken, however, suggest a fourth way in
which IOs may deflect threats to their reputation posed by credible charges that they
have violated international law. Specifically, IOs may seek to preserve their reputations
by adhering to the obligations that the IO Responsibility Articles would impose as a
consequence of a breach. The UN has emphatically not framed the cholera initiative
in terms of the IO Responsibility Articles. And yet, the steps that it has taken – leading
an initiative to eradicate cholera from Haiti and acknowledging a moral responsibility to do so – could be characterized as an incomplete effort to make reparations as
required by the IO Responsibility Articles.160 Reparation may involve restitution (reestablishing the situation that existed before the wrongful act was committed), paying
compensation for all financially assessable damage caused by the breach, and giving
satisfaction (by means of, inter alia, an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, or a formal apology).161 Like the State Responsibility Articles, the IO
Responsibility Articles rank the three forms of reparation, with a preference for restitution followed by compensation and satisfaction. Restitution is required unless it is
materially impossible or involves a burden out of all proportion to the benefit.162
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Conclusion
The ILC’s work on the IO Responsibility Articles has been dismissed by some states,
IOs, and academics as both premature and irrelevant. This article has argued that
the IO Responsibility Articles are neither. They are not premature because they can
help to clarify the content of the primary international law norms that bind IOs. And
they are not irrelevant because their invocation by transnational actors can spur IOs
to both participate in transnational discourse about their legal obligations and take
action to cease, correct, or make reparations for violations of international law.
There are, of course, still other ways in which the IO Responsibility Articles
could have practical effect. As the work product of the ILC, the IO Responsibility
Articles lack the status of binding law except to the extent that they reflect customary international law. The more the IO Responsibility Articles are invoked in
transnational discourse, the more likely they are to shape practice and, in turn,
prompt the further development of customary international law regarding IO
Responsibility.
More broadly, to the extent that the IO Responsibility Articles are invoked in transnational discourse, they will reinforce the expectation that IOs comply with their
international obligations. In turn, that could make it harder for IO officials or member
states to dismiss out of hand arguments that an IO might violate international law
in any particular instance. The idea that IOs should comply with their international
obligations would become part of the ‘taken-for-granted script[]’ of how IOs ought to
behave.164
Over time, these dynamics may serve to legitimate the IO Responsibility Articles as
well. Each time various transnational actors invoke the IO Responsibility Articles, they
implicitly signal their acceptance of those Articles. As this process is repeated over
163
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Eradicating cholera from Haiti would partially restore the status quo before UN
peacekeepers introduced cholera – although it would not, of course, revive the individuals who died from cholera or undo the suffering of those sickened by it. For that
reason, even if successful, the UN’s efforts to eradicate cholera would serve as partial
rather than full reparation. It remains to be seen whether the UN will offer any compensation to victims. And the Secretary-General’s statement from July 2014, which
expressed sadness and accepted moral responsibility for the UN, tracks examples of
satisfaction adduced by the ILC in its commentary to the IO Responsibility Articles.
Like the Secretary-General’s statement, the examples cited by the ILC do not expressly
refer to the existence of a breach of an international obligation. And yet, the ILC
stated, they serve as ‘one of the appropriate legal consequences’ of such breaches.163
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time and across a broad range of actors, the IO Articles as a whole – or at least those
articles that are consistently accepted – may gain a legitimacy that they lacked at the
moment that the ILC adopted them.
At the same time, transnational discourse over particular facets of IO responsibility
may yield a widespread rejection or persistent contestation of specific rules contained in
the ILC’s IO Responsibility Articles rather than acceptance. Should this occur, it should be
viewed as a valuable and welcome contribution to the development of international law.
Recall that the State Responsibility Articles are considered effective because of the readiness
with which international courts and tribunals have applied them. Some commentators
have worried that they are doing so too readily – without scrutinizing the content of the
rules or whether they actually reflect customary international law. The result is a missed
opportunity to revise the State Responsibility Articles where they are found wanting.165
Regardless of the fate of the IO Responsibility Articles, the question why IOs comply
with their international obligations remains a pressing one. This article has begun to
sketch an account that emphasizes transnational discourse and its effects on reputation. Future work will provide opportunities to test this work in a wider range of IOs
and IO activities, and to refine this account to identify those circumstances in which
the mechanisms this article identifies will be more or less effective.166
Future work will also provide an opportunity to evaluate the ways in which this
account might complement accounts that are based on internalization of norms. The
role of norm internalization in changing the behaviour of IO officials is not entirely
straightforward for two reasons. First, IO officials whose work is geared entirely
towards ensuring states comply with their international obligations are often slow
to acknowledge the applicability of those obligations to their own work.167 Secondly,
some international law norms have proved to be difficult to internalize because they
do not fit easily with the institutional culture. Galit Sarfaty, for example, argues that
human rights remain a marginal issue at the World Bank in part because of the dominance of economists on its staff.168
This article’s account of why IOs comply with their international obligations contributes to efforts to overcome the divide between rational-choice theories and normbased theories of why states comply with international law.169 As other scholars have
observed, IOs provide a promising subject for doing so.170 This article both assumes
that state interactions with IOs of which they are member states are strategic and

1018

EJIL 25 (2014), 991–1018

Downloaded from http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/ at University of Michigan Law Library on February 5, 2015

consistent with rational-choice models: that is, it assumes that states establish IOs and
continue to support them over time because member states find them useful for pursuing various policy goals. But it also posits that legal norms and legal discourse are consequential, and offers an account of why rational states acting in their own interests
have reason to take legal discourse about IOs seriously. This article thus merges rational-choice and norm-based approaches in part by explaining why some of the objections that rational-choice theorists have advanced for discounting legal discourse will
systematically have less force with respect to IOs.

